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Abstract 
This article constitutes an interdisciplinary analysis of the UK Government’s electronic identification 
system, GOV.UK Verify, and its compatibility with some important aspects of EU data protection 
law. Through an in-depth examination of the technological architecture of the GOV.UK Verify 
service, as well as some of the most significant constituent elements of both the Data Protection 
Directive and the imminent General Data Protection Regulation – notably the legitimising grounds for 
the processing of personal data and the doctrine of joint controllership –  the article highlights several 
flaws inherent in the GOV.UK Verify’s development and mode of operation, and advances the 
argument that it is incompatible with some major substantive provisions of the European Data 
Protection Framework. Other issues, such as potential incompatibilities between the terms of the 
General Data Protection Regulation and other associated pieces of legislation – notably the Regulation 
on Electronic Identification and Trust Services for Electronic Transactions in the Internal Market –  
can be reconciled are also considered.  
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1. Introduction 
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)1 was adopted by the European Union (EU) on 24th 
May 2016 will become applicable from 25 May 2018. It is intended to be a game changer for 
businesses operating within, or simply targeting, the EU Digital Single Market. Pursuant of this, we 
are now seeing the emergence of startups all over Europe promising to help businesses adapt to the 
evolving legal framework. Bigger companies have also been eager to invest in staff training as well as 
compliance assurance mechanisms and processes. The strengthening of the arsenal of punitive 
sanctions for breach of its terms largely explains why the GDPR has been under the spotlight since its 
adoption.   
   
Whether the GDPR should be seen as a regulatory revolution has been heavily debated by various 
observers since the beginning of its legislative process in 2012. It is undeniable for instance, that the 
roots of many of the GDPR’s substantive provisions can be traced to prior legislative instruments, 
notably the Data Protection Directive (DPD), which was adopted in 1995.2 Nevertheless, the GDPR 
coming into force will mean that many organisations that are already complying with the terms of the 
DPD will be required to modify some of their practices in order to remain compliant with various 
substantive tenets of the European data protection framework. This is particularly true in respect of 
mechanisms and procedures relating to data subject rights, as the list of rights contained in the GDPR 
is more expansive than that found in the DPD. However, there are also questions that can be asked in 
respect of the GDPR’s other notable provisions. Have, for instance, the rules relating to security 
measures that must be implemented by data controllers evolved as well? What about the rules 
regarding restrictions concerning the choice of appropriate legal bases by which personal data 
processing activities can be legitimised?   
 
As is the case under the outgoing DPD, the GDPR applies to public authorities. As alluded to above, 
most of the scholarly attention has focused on the implications of private actors having to comply 
with GDPR standards. Much less, however, has been written about the regulatory burden the GDPR 
imposes upon public authorities. This is perhaps surprising, as many Government services are 
underpinned by daily personal data processing activities and, on occasion, such services can be seen 
to transfer personal data to third parties for the performance of secondary activities, such as 
conducting research.  
 
Significantly, just like private sector institutions, public authorities can also be faced with data 
protection compliance issues. This can be neatly illustrated by two recent examples. First, on 12 th June 
2017, the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), the United Kingdom’s (UK) Data Protection 
Agency, fined Gloucester City Council £100,000 after a cyber attacker was able to gain access to 
council employees’ sensitive personal information. The second high-profile example which, despite 
not involving any monetary penalty, was arguably more significant, was the DeepMind saga. 
Specifically, on 3rd July 2017, in a letter to the Royal Free NHS Foundation Trust the ICO articulated 
a number of concerns it had in respect of the affiliation between the NHS and DeepMind 
Technologies Ltd, a British artificial intelligence company tasked with undertaking various personal 
data processing operations on behalf of the NHS. Notably, the ICO stated that “the processing of 
                                              
1
 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection 
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, pp. 1–88.  
2
 Officially known as Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on 
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data. [hereinafter the DPD] 
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approximately 1.6 million patients’ personal data by DeepMind Technologies Limited (‘DeepMind’) 
for the purpose of the clinical safety testing of the Streams application did not fully comply with the 
requirements of the Data Protection Act 1998.”3 
 
An observable trend in eGovernment initiatives throughout Europe in recent years has been the 
emergence and rollout of electronic identity schemes that allow individuals to manage and 
authenticate their identities in conjunction with the use of online public services. Against this 
background, the UK Government has recently been developing its own electronic identification (eID) 
scheme, Gov.UK Verify. This service, which delegates the verification of users’ identities to a range 
of certified private companies, claims to provide a safer, simpler, and faster way of accessing 
government services. 
 
The development of GOV.UK Verify can also be situated in the context of the encouragement of the 
deployment of electronic schemes at the European Union level with the adoption of the Regulation on 
electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market (eIDAS) 4 
in 2014, two years prior to the adoption of the GDPR. To be clear, eIDAS does not impose the 
creation of national eID schemes as such, but aims to ensure their interoperability through the 
application of the principle of mutual recognition once Member States decide to notify their national 
schemes to the European Commission.  
 
Importantly, eIDAS makes it clear that the processing of personal data inherent in national eID 
schemes must comply with EU data protection law.5 Obviously, in 2014 the EU’s leading legislative 
instrument in the data protection field was the DPD. However, in some ways eIDAS could be 
described as anticipating the GDPR. For instance, in eIDAS’ text one can find express references to 
key GDPR concepts such as privacy by design.6 The use of eID schemes as a means of managing 
identities necessarily involves the processing of individuals’ personal data and, consequently, means 
that all such services, including GOV.UK Verify, must comply with EU data protection law. 
Importantly, Brexit, i.e. the UK leaving the European Union, should not affect this requirement. The 
message from the UK government and the ICO has always been that the substance of the GDPR, if 
not the GDPR itself, will be part of UK law.7 The strongest commitment to this ideal to date being the 
recent announcement of a new Data Protection Bill designed to transpose the terms of the GDPR into 
UK law.8  
                                              
3
 Elisabeth Denham, Information Commissioner, Letter to Sir David Solman, 3
rd
 July 2017, available at: 
https://ico.org.uk/media/action-weve-taken/undertakings/2014353/undertaking-cover-letter-revised-04072017-
to-first-person.pdf.   
4
 Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic 
identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 
1999/93/EC OJ L 257, 28.8.2014, pp. 73–114.  
5
 Article 5(1) eIDAS.  
6
 Generally speaking, the term “Privacy by Design” refers to an approach to the construction of technological 
communications systems, data processing technologies, and computer networks in which privacy is taken into 
account at all stages of the design process. On this topic, see: Cavoukian, A. (2011) “Privacy by Design”, 
Information & Privacy Commissioner of Ontario. 
7
 Out-Law.com (last accessed October 2017) “GDPR will come into force in the UK in 2018, minister 
confirms”, https://www.out-law.com/en/articles/2016/november/gdpr-will-come-into-force-in-the-uk-in-2018-
minister-confirms/.  
8
 Gov.UK (last accessed October 2017) “Government to strengthen UK data protection law”, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-to-strengthen-uk-data-protection-law. The Data Protection 
Bill was introduced to the House of Lords on 13 September 2017, See: Gov. UK (last accessed October 2017) 
“Data Protection Bill 2017”, https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/data-protection-bill-2017.   
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This article focuses on the issue of data protection law compliance in the context of eID schemes and 
examines GOV.UK Verify’s compliance with some substantive provisions of the EU data protection 
framework. It identifies some inadequacies inherent in GOV.UK Verify’s general setup in the light of 
the GDPR and ultimately argues that its operation lacks an adequate legal basis. Essentially, the 
reason for this is because, despite the detailed allocation of roles between the different GOV.UK 
Verify actors, the process of electronic identification by the identity providers involved creates a 
situation of joint controllership.  
 
GOV.UK Verify is therefore used as a case study to illustrate one key compliance challenge brought 
about by the GDPR which is relevant for both private and public entities: the establishment of a 
proper legal basis for the processing of personal data. Notably, the GDPR provides that 
“infringements of [the basic principles for processing, including conditions for consent, pursuant to 
Articles 5, 6, 7 and 9] shall …be subject to administrative fines up to 20 000 000 EUR, or in the case 
of an undertaking, up to 4 % of the total worldwide annual turnover of the preceding financial year, 
whichever is higher.”9 Accordingly, the choosing of an appropriate legal basis for personal data 
processing is evidently a crucial exercise for legal compliance purposes. Interestingly, in the 
DeepMind affair, mentioned above, the ICO did not deem it necessary to issue any monetary penalty 
even though several violations of the UK Data Protection Act were found to have occurred, one of 
which being the fact that Deep Mind’s personal data processing activities had an erroneous legal 
basis.  
 
The legal assessment of Gov.UK Verify is then pushed further. Having highlighted how establishing 
an appropriate basis for the processing of personal data is an important and difficult compliance 
challenge, the article also suggests that if a situation of joint controllership can be established, not 
only will the dual legal basis identified for the UK eID scheme be problematic, but issues will also 
arise in conjunction with the liability stipulations found in the framework agreement governing the 
relationships between the Government Digital Service and certified service providers, i.e. identity 
providers. Yet, given the inclusion of a right to compensation in the GDPR, based on a presumption 
of liability the framework agreement is problematic from a legal compliance standpoint. It is true, for 
instance, that Article 11 of eIDAS itself contains a provision on liability. However, it is argued that to 
make Article 11 of eIDAS compatible with Article 82 of the GDPR, GDPR Article 82 should be 
applied if the damage caused to a natural or legal person is the result of an infringement of the GDPR, 
e.g. security obligations as per Article 32 GDPR, as eIDAS legislative intent is neither to derogate 
from EU data protection law nor to set lower standards of data protection, 
 
To this end, the article consists of four main sections. The first section comprehensively outlines 
GOV.UK Verify, drawing attention to its technical and operational dimensions, including the 
substance of the data protection impact assessment (DPIA) performed during its design stages. The 
second section sketches and discusses the various legal bases for the processing of personal data as 
enshrined within the EU data protection framework. The third section suggests that the processing of 
personal data by identity providers should be considered a situation of joint controllership and thereby 
adds an element of complexity to the picture by analysing the implications of such a characterisation 
for establishing an adequate legal basis for personal data processing. It thus provides insight as to how 
the concept of joint controllership should be interpreted in practice, which should have relevance for 
                                              
9
 Article 83(5) General Data Protection Regulation.  
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other cases such as the DeepMind saga.10 The final substantive section then derives the consequences 
of the characterisation of a situation of joint controllership for the allocation of liability between the 
different stakeholders, and raises a fundamental question for the consistency of the legal framework 
built for sustaining the EU digital single market: how can eIDAS and the GDPR be combined? 
Notably, this high-level question is not a one-shot interrogation and similar questions arise in 
conjunction with other pieces of legislation, such as the proposal for a new ePrivacy Regulation 
released in January 2017.11  
 
The ambition of this article is, therefore, to highlight the limits of a regulatory approach implemented 
in silos. The article is a product of a desk research methodology, which was contextual and 
interdisciplinary in nature, and targeted traditional primary and secondary legal sources but also soft 
law instruments such as data protection agencies’ guidance, design and contractual documents such as 
data protection impact assessments or framework agreements and focusing upon a specific scenario of 
electronic identification. It ultimately suggests that the traditional interpretative principle of “lex 
specialis derogat legi generali,” is not suitably geared towards solving conflicts arising between the 
GDPR and eIDAS. This is despite the fact that this approach has previously been used on occasion by 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) to solve conflicts between different pieces of 
legislation.  
2. GOV.UK Verify: a case study 
To perform a legal assessment of GOV.UK Verify it is first necessary to reflect upon the inception of 
the project, outline its architectures, identify its main actors, map the data flows between the different 
components of the system, and consider the perceptions of those involved in the design of the scheme 
in relation to the data protection implications and challenges inherent in its establishment.   
2.1 The History 
In 2013 the UK Government published its ‘Government Digital Strategy’. One of the strategy’s 
central points was to transition all public services to a ‘Digital by Default’ operation, whereby 
electronic transactions would be the default means of transacting with members of the public.12 Action 
11 of the Government’s transformation plan promised that the Government Digital Service (GDS) 
would “develop a framework to enable federated identity assurance to be adopted across government 
services in due course.”13 Identity assurance emerged as a response to the previous failed attempt to 
introduce an identity card for all citizens, a proposal which would have required the establishment of a 
central ‘National Identity Register’ and an electronic identification functionality.14 The proposal for a 
National Identity Register was met with concern, and the plan for identity cards and the central 
                                              
10
 It is however striking to note that the ICO decided to assess Deep Mind’s practices on the basis that Deep 
Mind was only a processor and not a data controller. See: ICO (last accessed August 2017) “Royal Free - 
Google DeepMind trial failed to comply with data protection law”, https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-
events/news-and-blogs/2017/07/royal-free-google-deepmind-trial-failed-to-comply-with-data-protection-law/  
11
 Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council concerning the respect for private life 
and the protection of personal data in electronic communications and repealing Directive 2002/58/EC 
(Regulation on Privacy and Electronic Communications) COM(2017) 10 final. 
12
 Cabinet Office (last accessed October 2017) “Government Digital Strategy: December 2013” 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/government-digital-strategy/government-digital-strategy - 
“Digital by default means digital services which are so straightforward and convenient that all those who can 
use digital services will choose to do so, while those who can’t are not excluded.” 
13
 Ibid Action 11. 
14
 Identity Cards Act 2006 c 15 s1. 
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Register were scrapped with the enactment of the Identity Documents Act 2010.15 Subsequent plans 
for electronic identification focused on software tokens and de-centralised approaches. 
  
The GDS’ `Identity Assurance Programme’, later named ‘GOV.UK Verify’, was developed to replace 
the ‘Government Gateway’ platform, which was used to access most public services.16 In the UK 
Digital Strategy for 2017, GOV.UK Verify is described as “a federated, market-based approach to 
identity assurance for central government that can be reused in the wider public and private 
sectors.”17 It has been designed around a set of “Identity and Privacy Principles”,18 focused on 
“individual control and consent”.19 The principles were set up by an advisory group, whose purpose is 
to safeguard users’ privacy.20 Amongst them, Principle 1 prescribes that the user “can exercise control 
over identity assurance activities” which “can only take place if [they] consent or approve them”21 
and Principle 4 concerning Data Minimisation mandates that “interactions only use the minimum data 
necessary”.22  
2.2 Architecture and actors 
The premise behind GOV.UK Verify’s design is the notion that eID schemes should not operate under 
the sole control of a central Governmental agency. The 9 “Identity and Privacy Principles”23 specify 
minimum standards in respect of any eID scheme’s operation. The principles aim at a technology-
neutral approach; they form targets the system should achieve but do not dictate specific means as to 
how to achieve them. GOV.UK Verify focuses heavily on user choice: specifically, the idea that the 
user should be able to decide the number of eIDs they own, as well who is able to access and hold 
their personal data.24 Hence the creation of an ‘Identity marketplace’ was settled upon. Although the 
marketplace is based on a public platform, a hub which is owned and controlled by the GDS, the 
electronic identification of users is provided by private companies who act as Identity Providers. 
 
Identity Providers have to be certified “against common governance requirements”, under the Identity 
Assurance Principle no. 7.25 Certification, as outlined in the Framework agreement,26 is three-fold: (a) 
                                              
15
 2010 c 40 ss. 1-3. 
16
 Government Gateway (last accessed October 2017) ‘What is the Government Gateway’, available at: 
http://www.gateway.gov.uk/Help/Help.aspx?content=help_more_info_gateway.htm 
17
 Cabinet Office (2017) “UK Digital Strategy 2017” https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-digital-
strategy/uk-digital-strategy” ch 6. 
18
 Privacy and Consumer Advisory Group (2014) Identity Assurance Principles, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/361496/PCAG_IDA_Principles_
3.1__4_.pdf> [preserved at: https://perma.cc/5K2W-8BVK] 
19
 Ibid p. 3. 
20
 Cabinet Office (2014) “Privacy and Consumer Advisory Group”, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/privacy-and-consumer-advisory-group. “PCAG aims to ensure: users 
are in control of their information[;] information isn’t centralised[;] users have a choice of who provides 
services on their behalf”. 
21
 Ibid. 
22
 Ibid. 
23
 (1) The User Control Principle; (2) the Transparency Principle; (3) the Multiplicity Principle; (4) the Data 
Minimisation Principle; (5) the Data Quality Principle; (6) the Service-User Access and Portability Principle; (7) 
the Governance/Certification Principle; (8) the Problem Resolution Principle; (9) the Exceptional Circumstances 
Principle. See Privacy and Consumer Advisory Group, Identity Assurance Principles, n. 18. 
24
 Ibid, the Multiplicity Principle: “I can use and choose as many different identifiers or identity providers as I 
want to.” 
25
 Principles n. 18 pg.10. 
26
 Cabinet Office, (2014) “Framework Agreement and Schedules” Draft v0.9, pg.18. available 
at:http://data.gov.uk/data/contracts-finder-archive/contract/1690273/ 
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certification against industry standards for information security,27 certification that they meet 
government standards for identity assurance,28 and complies with data protection law (certified 
through a Privacy Impact Assessment).29 In relation to certification for identity assurance, the 
Framework explicitly mentions tScheme as the certification body.30 tScheme is the “Trusted List 
Scheme Operator (TLSO) and creates, hosts and maintains the UK’s Trust Service-status List (TSL) 
on behalf of the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS)”31 of the Qualified 
Trust Service Providers required by eIDAS.32 It accredits certification to Identity Providers against 
five ‘Approval Profiles’.33 It is not clear, however, how many of these profiles an Identity Provider 
necessarily needs to satisfy to become certified. However, it is worth noting that several of the current 
certified providers have been accredited with four or five of these profiles.34 It is also interesting to 
note that not all providers in GOV.UK Verify’s list are certified (particularly, the Post Office is one 
notable example of a provider that has not been certified by tScheme)35 and that communication from 
the GDS considers evidence of “working towards independent certification” to be an acceptable 
criterion for becoming a provider.36 Electronic identification is organised according to ‘Levels of 
Assurance’ (LOA), a risk-based assessment based on the “degree of confidence the government 
service requires that a user is who they say they are.”37 The system uses software credentials for 
identification, a combination of “usernames, passwords and security codes.”38 Communication within 
the GOV.UK Verify federation happens through the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML 
2.0)39 and data are signed and verified through a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).40 
                                              
27
 The Framework mentions ISO 27001 and ISO 15489-1, but accepts other equivalent standards: ibid, s. 8.10(g) 
and sch. 5(a)(2)(b). 
28
 Ibid s. 8.10(f)j and sch. 5(a)(2)(a)(i). 
29
 Ibid, sch. 5(a)(2)(d). 
30
 Ibid, pg. 83, although the government retains the right to change the certification body in the future: “any 
organisation that has been approved for the assessment of trust services to the satisfaction of the Authority and 
that has been notified by the Authority as a Certification Body from time to time”. 
31
 Energy and Industrial Strategy Department for Business (2016) Electronic Signatures and Trust Services, 
pg.9. available at:https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/545098/beis-
16-15-electronic-signatures-guidance.pdf 
32
 tScheme, (last accessed October 2017) 'UK's Trusted List' (Support for the eIDAS Regulation, 2017) 
http://www.tscheme.org/UK_TSL/index.html 
33
 Base Approval Profile (tSd0111); Profile for Identity Registration (tSd0108); Profile for Credential Validation 
(tSd0109); Profile for Attribute Registration (tSd0110); Profile for an Identity Provider (tSd0112); Profile for 
Credential Management (tSd0113): tScheme (last accessed October 2017) “Digests of Approval Profiles for 
IdP-related Services” http://www.tscheme.org/profiles/IdP_digest_2.html. 
34
 See for example Experian’s Grant of Approval who satisfies four 
(http://www.tscheme.org/directory/EXPN_IDaaS/index.html) compared to Barclays’ which satisfies five 
(http://www.tscheme.org/directory/Barclays/index.html). 
35
 GDS justifies this omission by explaining that the Post Office uses the system of another provider to offer its 
services and therefore the certification of the other provider is deemed enough. See: Gov.uk (last accessed 
October 2017) “Working with identity providers as they become certified companies”,  
https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/2015/12/03/working-with-identity-providers-as-they-become-certified-
companies/#comment-41610. 
36
 Alastair Williamson-Pound, A. Gov.UK Verify Blog (2016) (last accessed October 2017) “Becoming a 
GOV.UK Verify certified company”, https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/2016/02/25/becoming-a-gov-uk-
verify-certified-company 
37
 Government Digital Service (2014) ‘Gov.UK Verify Technical Guide’,  Glossary of terms, available at: 
http://alphagov.github.io/rp-onboarding-tech-docs/index.html 
38
 Ibid. 
39
 Cabinet Office, Identity Assurance Hub Service SAML 2.0 Profile v1.2a, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/279643/Identity_Assurance_Hub
_Service_Profile_v1.2a.pdf 
40
 Identity Assurance Team (2015) Identity Assurance Documentation, available at: 
https://media.readthedocs.org/pdf/random/latest/random.pdf 
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Levels of Assurance (LOA) 
LOA 1 Used when a government service needs to know that it’s the same user returning to the 
service but doesn’t need to know who that user is. 
LOA 2 Used when a government service needs to know on the balance of probabilities who 
the user is and that that they are a real person. 
LOA 3 Used when a government service needs to know beyond reasonable doubt who the user 
is and that that they are a real person. 
LOA 4 As level of assurance 3, but with a biometric profile captured at the point of 
registration. 
 
Table 1: the four different LOA41 
 
 
  
Gov.UK Verify’s architecture thus comprises five key elements: 
 
(1) The Federation Hub: a central infrastructure that mediates all interactions between users, 
Identity Providers and Services (or Service Providers). The Hub leases eID services from the 
private Identity Providers. The Hub acts as a broker to exchanges between parties. These 
exchanges which are concealed from the different parties, ensuring that the Identity Provider 
itself remains unknown to the Service Provider. The Hub ensures that the required LOA is 
adhered to and does not collect or store data beyond the current session (stateless operation).42  
 
(2)  The Service Provider: Service providers are the different public services that can request the 
electronic identification of the user in order to transact with them. At the moment, service 
providers in the GOV.UK Verify federation are solely governmental departments.43 
 
(3) The Identity Provider: Identity providers are “[p]rivate sector organisations, paid by the 
government, to verify that a user is who they say they are and assert verified data that 
                                              
41
 Government Digital Service, 'Gov.UK Verify Technical Guide' (n. Error! Bookmark not defined.), Glossary 
of terms; Cabinet Office (2014) 'Good Practice Guide No. 45: Identity Proofing and Verification of an 
Individual', pg.9. available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/370033/GPG_45_identity_proofi
ng_v2_3_July_2014.pdf 
42
 Ibid, Architecture. 
43
 Ibid, Glossary ‘Relying party’. 
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identifies them to a government service.”44 They verify the user’s identity against various 
authoritative sources, like the HM Passports Office and the Driving Licensing Authority 
(DVLA).45 
 
(4)  The Matching Service: a middleware deployed at the Service Provider level the purpose of 
which is to match the eID received by the Identity Provider to a local account in the Service 
Provider’s database. 
 
(5) The Document Checking Service: a supplementary service designed and operated by the 
Government Digital Service (GDS), whose role is to check the official documents provided 
by the user against authoritative sources. At the moment, checks are performed against the 
HM Passport Office or the DVLA.46 The system returns an attestation of the authenticity of 
the documents to the Identity Provider, meaning that Identity Providers are not required to 
directly access official records. The Document Checking Service is not engaged in every eID 
transaction; instead it is only needed for the registration of a new user with an Identity 
Provider 
 
From this description, it thus appears that the Gov.UK Verify system involve 4 actors:  
1. The GDS, operating the Federation Hub and the Document Checking Service.  
2. Government Services acting as relying parties, which request authentication (in the sense of 
verification of identity) and which host matching services also characterised as service 
providers.  
3. Certification companies acting as identity providers. 
4. Service users.  
                                              
44
 Government Digital Service (2016) Gov.UK Verify Data Protection Impact Assessment, pg.10. available at: 
https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/36/2016/05/GOV-UK-Verify-DPIA-v1.0.pdf 
45
 Gov.UK Verify (2014) ‘Validating identity information against an authoritative source’, available at: 
https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/2014/10/10/introducing-the-document-checking-service/ 
46
 GDS has announced its intention to expand on the sources used for the Document Checking Service, but 
further information has not yet been published: Janet Hughes, J. Gov.UK Verify Blog (2014) (last accessed 
October 2017) 'How we’re working to increase the range of data sources available for GOV.UK Verify', 
https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/2014/12/01/data-sources/ 
Figure 1: Gov.UK Verify actors and data flows (adapted)
47 
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2.3 Data flows 
47
 
The typical user journey in Gov.UK Verify starts when a user requests an identification against a 
governmental service. The service sends an authentication request to the Hub (step 1, Figure 1) 
indicating the requested LOA (at the moment Gov.UK Verify supports only LOA 2).48 The request is 
signed by the Service Provider. The Hub prompts the user to select one of the available Identity The 
typical user journey in GOV.UK Verify starts when a user asserts their identity when attempting to 
access a governmental service. The service sends an authentication request to the Hub (step 1, Figure 
1) indicating the requested LOA (at present GOV.UK Verify supports only LOA 2).49 The request is 
signed by the Service Provider. The Hub prompts the user to select one of the available Identity 
Providers, depending on the available data the user has made available for the purposes of verifying 
their identity. An authentication request is sent to the selected Identity Provider, signed by the Hub 
(step 2, Figure 1). The Identity Provider verifies the user’s identity according to the indicated LOA. 
The verified identity (the eID) is sent as a response to the Hub, signed by the Identity Provider (step 3, 
Figure 1). The eID contains an ‘authentication assertion’ – encrypted for the Hub – which asserts that 
the user’s identity is authenticated and contains contextual information including the LOA.50 It also 
contains an ‘Identity assertion’, also encrypted for the Hub, containing two elements: the Matching 
Dataset and a Persistent Identifier. The Matching Dataset comprises of the same information for every 
eID.51 The Persistent Identifier is a pseudo-random value generated by the Identity Provider and refers 
to the combination of the user and the chosen identity provider.52 The ‘Identity assertion’ is then sent 
by the Hub to the Matching Service located at the Service Provider. The ‘Identity assertion’ retains 
the signature of the Identity Provider and is encrypted for the Matching Service (step 4, Figure 1). The 
Matching Service then performs a series of attempts to match the ‘Identity assertion’ to a local user 
record, a process known as ‘matching cycles’. The first cycle, ‘cycle 0’, starts when the Matching 
Service changes the Persistent Identifier to a hashed value, which is created by a combination of user, 
Identity Provider and Service Provider.53 After the creation of the hashed persistent identifier, the 
Matching Service looks up a local datastore to see if the same hashed value already exists and whether 
it can be associated with a local record. If a match is found, the ‘Identity assertion’ along with the 
hashed identifier are forwarded to the Service Provider. If not, the Matching Service tries to determine 
a match using the values of the matching dataset (‘cycle 1’). If no match is found subsequent cycles 
will ask the user for additional attributes. When a match is found the Matching Service sends a 
‘match’ response along with the ‘Identity assertion’ back to the Hub, signed by the Matching Service 
and encrypted for the Hub (step 6, Figure 1). The Hub sends the signed ‘Identity assertion’ in an 
encrypted form to the Service Provider (step 7, Figure 1), which then retrieves the local record from 
its database. 
 
                                              
47
 Identity Assurance Team, Identity Assurance Documentation (n. Error! Bookmark not defined.), pp. 7-9. 
48
 Government Digital Service, 'Gov.UK Verify Technical Guide' (n. Error! Bookmark not defined.), 
‘Architecture’. 
49
 Government Digital Service (2014) ‘Gov.UK Verify Technical Guide’ n. 26, ‘Architecture’. 
50
 Ibid, ‘How SAML works with Gov.UK Verify’. 
51
 Ibid, Glossary ‘Matching dataset’. 
52
 Ibid, Glossary ‘Persistent identifier (PID)’. 
53
 Ibid, Glossary ‘Hashed persistent identifier (PID)’: “This ensures that identifiers for user identity are unique 
to specific services and can’t be used across multiple services.” 
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Matching Dataset 
First name 
Middle name (if provided) 
Surname 
Address 
Date of birth 
Gender (optional) 
 
Table 2: Gov.UK Verify's Matching Dataset 
2.4 Gov.UK Verify Data Protection Impact Assessment  
 
While GOV.UK Verify’s data protection impact Assessment (DPIA) was obviously undertaken 
before 25th May 2018, the date at which the GDPR becomes applicable, it was published on 18 th May 
2016, after the public release of the final text of the GDPR, which, as noted above, was adopted on 
25th May 2016.54 The authors of the DPIA were, therefore, fully aware of the content of the GDPR at 
the time of the impact assessment’s release. This is well evidence by the way in which the title of the 
impact assessment document was altered in order “to reflect the terminology of the new EU General 
Data Protection Regulation.”55 Despite demonstrating an initial general awareness of the GDPR, 
however, the drafters of the DPIA recognised that a second impact assessment would be required at a 
later date in order to fully take into account the changes brought about by the GDPR. It is therefore 
expressly stated in the document that the “DPIA does not consider the requirements of the EU 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), since the final text was only approved in May 2016.”56 
However, more than one year after the publication of the initial DPIA no new impact assessment has 
been released to the public.  
                                              
54
 The first version of the data protection impact assessment is dated 27 January 2015. The document was then 
modified on 15 February 2015, 31 March 2016, and several times in May 2016 (13 May 2016, 16 May 2016 and 
18 May 2016). An initial data protection impact assessment had been conducted in September 2014 for project 
approval purposes.  
55
 DPIA, pg. 6.  
56
 Ibid, pg. 7.  
12 
 
The DPIA is said to follow the approach advocated by the ICO in its code of practice on data 
protection impact assessment but with a notable caveat. Particularly, it:  
 
“…has been modified to take into account other specific requirements for the GOV.UK 
Verify environment, most notably the Identity Assurance Principles published by the 
Cabinet Office Privacy and Consumer Advisory Group (PCAG).”57  
 
The approach has been described as being aligned to the requirements of ISO2001 standards.58 The 
DPIA identifies three data controllers: the GDS, the Certified Companies and Government Services. 59 
We therefore have at least two public authorities and a set of private actors acting as data controllers 
for the purposes of data protection law. In regards to identifying the legal basis for the processing of 
personal data in this context, two prominent possibilities appear to emerge: the individuals’ whose 
personal data are involved giving their consent, and justifying the processing of personal data on the 
basis that said processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest 
or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller:  
 
“GOV.UK Verify uses consent to enable processing, and processing is also enabled by 
Data Protection Act Schedule 2 Part 5 (c) for the exercise of any functions of the Crown, 
a Minister of the Crown or a government, and (d) for the exercise of any other functions 
of a public nature exercised in the public interest by any person.”60  
 
Having said this, consent as a legal basis seems to be used for one type of processing and thereby one 
type of relationship: the processing undertaken by certified companies at the request of service users. 
One can read to that effect:  
 
The Certified Company obtains consent to operate an account for the Service User, and 
to collect, share and maintain the personal information in order to verify and maintain 
the servicer user’s identity. The Certified Company obtains consent from the Service 
User to release matching data to the Federation Hub and on to the Government Service, 
at the request of the Service User.61  
 
The importance of consent in the relationship between service users and certified companies is also 
described as being the result of the implementation of the first identity assurance principle. As noted 
above, the identity assurance principles are principles that have been developed to support the creation 
of an identity assurance service. The first identity assurance principle is formulated in these terms:  
 
“I can exercise control over identity assurance activities affecting me and these can only take 
place if I consent or approve them.”62  
 
                                              
57
 Ibid, pg. 6.  
58
 Ibid, pg. 7.  
59
 Ibid, pg. 10. See also Table 2: stakeholder analysis pg. 17.  
60
 Ibid, p. 10.  
61
 Ibid 
62
 Privacy and consumer advisory group (PCAG), Identity Assurance Principles, version 3.1, pg. 8, available at  
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/361496/PCAG_IDA_Principles_
3.1__4_.pdf 
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However, consent does not seem to be of use solely to certified companies. To the question as to 
whether “suppliers/partners have the right to use the personal information collected or shared under 
the service for their own purposes”63 the answer appears to be that “Government Services may use 
information for their own purposes, but will have to disclose purposes and details of information 
required to the service user on a per-transaction basis, and seek appropriate consent.”64  
 
Interestingly, GOV.UK Verify’s DPIA does not adhere to the terminology of eIDAS. eIDAS 
distinguishes between three types of actors for the operation of eID schemes: the notifying Member 
State, the party issuing the electronic identification means, and the party operating the authentication 
procedure. The electronic identification means is defined as per Article 3(2) eIDAS as: 
 
“a material and/or immaterial unit containing person identification data and which is used 
for authentication for an online service.”  
 
In the context of GOV.UK Verify identity providers are thus the parties issuing the electronic means 
of identification, even if a matching service sits within each (government) service provider. In respect 
of the party operating the authentication procedure, however, the characterisation may be less 
straightforward.  Article 3(5) eIDAS defines authentication as: 
 
“…an electronic process that enables the electronic identification of a natural or legal 
person, or the origin and integrity of data in electronic form to be confirmed”  
 
In the context of GOV.UK Verify, the GDS should be characterised as the party operating the 
authentication procedure, to the exclusion of (Government) service providers. The combination of 
Articles 11(3) and 7(f) eIDAS is however not obvious as although Article 11(3) targets the party 
operating the authentication procedure and refers back to Article 7(f), Article 7(f) itself only mentions 
the notifying Member State.   
 
From this introduction to the conception of the UK eID scheme, it appears that consent was, and 
presumably still is, intended to play a prominent role in legitimising the processing of personal data 
for purposes of user authentication. Concurrently, it is important to note that consent has never been, 
nor should it be, thought of as the exclusive legal basis through which the processing of personal data 
can be legitimised. Still, in order to provide a platform from which the choices made by the GDS can 
be assessed, as the GDPR does not exactly repeat the same words as the DPD, it is worth verifying 
what the implications of the GDPR are, or at least should be (as obviously the GDPR has not been 
litigated yet and therefore interpretation can only be tentative), in respect of choosing an appropriate 
legal basis for personal data processing.   
3. Choosing the appropriate legal basis 
The requirement of lawfulness of personal data processing spans a relatively large range of legal 
bases. Only those that appear to be the most relevant for the activities of electronic identification 
within the framework of an eID scheme will be examined in this section: individual consent, 
processing that is necessary for the conclusion or performance of a contract to which the data subject 
is a party, processing that is necessary for the performance of task carried out in the public interest or 
in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller, and processing that is necessary for the 
                                              
63
  
64
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purposes of the legitimate interests of the data controller or other third party. The dual legal basis 
relied upon by GOV.Uk Verify is then assessed in the light of a consideration of these 
abovementioned examinations. This exercise necessarily requires going back to the DPD to determine 
whether, how, and to what extent, the GDPR goes beyond it.  
3.1 The legal bases for personal data processing and their applicability to GOV.UK Verify 
As alluded to above, the European data protection law imposes a range of substantive requirements on 
any act of data processing that involves personal data. Personal data is an expansive concept, which 
encompasses any information that can be related to an identified or identifiable information, and thus 
includes, but is not limited to, an individual’s name, age, race, gender, sexual preferences, political 
affiliations, internet search histories, and health and financial information.65 Processing is a similarly 
broad term, which is taken to encompass almost any form of personal data usage.66 
 
Perhaps the most significant substantive requirement imposed by the European data protection 
framework is the fact that the processing of personal data will only be considered lawful if one, or 
more, of a finite number of prescribed legitimising grounds for that processing can be identified. 
Namely, in order for the processing of personal data to be rendered lawful the controller of those data 
must show that either: the individual to whom those personal data relate has given their consent to 
their personal data being processed for a specific purpose; the processing is necessary for the 
performance of a contract; the processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which 
the data controller is subject; the processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the 
data subject or another natural person; the processing is necessary for the performance of a task 
carried out in the public interest; or the processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate 
interests pursued by the data controller or another third party.67 
 
For several reasons, it would appear that GOV.UK Verify must comply with data protection law’s 
substantive provisions. Firstly, as has been noted elsewhere, all data processing activities involving 
individuals’ personal data that are undertaken by either private or public-sector bodies fall within the 
scope of data protection law unless they have been specifically omitted. A notable of such an 
omission being data processing activities that are undertaken in conjunction with law enforcement 
proceedings.68  
 
At this point it is important to recall that GOV.UK Verify has a somewhat unusual structure in that it 
cannot accurately be described as a completely private or public-sector service. Instead, GOV.UK 
Verify might best be described as a Public-Private Partnership, a term broadly used to refer to 
                                              
65
 See: Article 2(a) Data Protection Directive and Article 4(1) General Data Protection Regulation. 
66
 See: Article 2(b) Data Protection Directive and Article 4(2) General Data Protection Regulation; Case C-
101/01 Bodil Lindqvist, EU:C:2003:596; Case C-461/10 Bonnier Audi AB and others v Perfect Communication 
Sweden, EU:C:2012:219; Case C-291/12 Michael Schwarz v Stadt Bochum, EU:C:2013:670. 
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 Article 7 Data Protection Directive and Article 6 General Data Protection Regulation. 
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 Purtova, N. (2017) “Between GDPR and the Police Directive: Navigating Through the Maze of Information 
Sharing in Public-Private Partnerships”, available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2930078; Klingenberg, A. (2016) 
“Catches to the right to be forgotten, looking from an administrative law perspective to data processing by 
public authorities”, International Review of Law Computers and Technology. See also: Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party (2013) Opinion 06/2013 on open data and public sector information (‘PSI’) reuse 
WP207; Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the 
purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of 
criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 
2008/977/JHA [2016] OJ L119/89.  
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arrangements between government and private sector institutions in which partially or traditionally 
public activities are performed by private sector organisations.69 Significantly in this regard, however, 
as has been argued elsewhere, arrangements which involve private parties entering systematic 
collaborative endeavours with governmental and other public sector bodies will be subject to the same 
remit of data protection obligations as any other private or public party.70 
 
Secondly, as touched upon previously, the abovementioned eIDAS Regulation71 defines an 
interoperability framework of national eID services which requires all Member States to notify the 
European Commission of the interoperability of their national eID scheme, and demonstrate it 
conforms to a number of other substantive requirements, if they wish to operate their scheme on a 
cross-border basis.72 Successful notification comes after a lengthy deliberation process where Member 
States make (non-binding) suggestions on the eID scheme in question.73 Upon acceptance of the 
notified scheme, all other Member States are obliged to incorporate it into their individual 
authentication services.74 Significantly, one notable requirement imposed by the eIDAS Regulation is 
that in order to achieve successful notification any national eID scheme must comply with the 
substantive provisions of European data protection law, with specific reference being made to the 
need to comply with the data minimisation principle.75 Though the UK government has not signalled 
its intention to notify GOV.UK Verify, this will surely be required if the scheme is to have any 
prospect of international success.  
 
The above considerations indicate that Gov.UK Verify must comply with the substantive provisions 
of European data protection law, including the need for it to have a legitimate basis at all times for the 
processing of any personal data. In this respect, and as also touched upon above, whilst the data 
protection framework contains a number of grounds upon which the processing of personal data can 
be rendered legitimate, in the GOV.UK Verify context two legal bases have been put forward: consent 
of the individual and performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of 
official authority vested in the controller.76  
 
Consent is expressly referred to by the GOV.UK Verify website itself, which specifically states that 
no personal data will be processed as part of the GOV.UK Verify scheme without the consent of any 
individuals involved.77 However, as suggested at this article’s outset, there are reasons to believe that 
GOV.UK Verify does not comply with the European data protection framework’s rules regarding 
consent as a legitimising ground for the processing of personal data. Before examining this notion in 
more detail, it is first important to consider the doctrine of individual consent under both the DPD and 
the GDPR, as well as the other legitimising grounds for processing listed by both instruments. 
                                              
69
 Savas, E. (2000) Privatisation and Public-Private Partnerships, New York: Chatham House, pg.4. See also: 
Recital 97 General Data Protection Regulation. 
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3.2 Consent 
The consent of the individual is listed as a legitimising ground for the processing of personal data 
under both the DPD and GDPR. However, the formulations of consent differ between these two 
legislative instruments, and so it is important to consider them individually in turn. 
 
3.2.1 The Data Protection Directive 
 
Article 2(h) of the DPD defines consent as: 
 
“…any freely given specific and informed indication of his wishes by which the data subject 
signifies his agreement to personal data relating to him being processed”. 
 
Article 7(a) then states that data may be processed when: 
 
“the data subject has unambiguously given his consent”. 
 
Accordingly, the giving of free, specific, informed and unambiguous consent is one way by which the 
processing of personal data can be rendered legitimate under the DPD.78 In some ways the DPD’s 
definition of consent could be considered somewhat restrictive, as it requires that the individual be 
clearly informed of what it is they are consenting to in advance of any consent being given. This 
approach is broadly in line with the existing data protection laws of most EU Member States, many of 
which have defined consent with similar restrictiveness.79 
 
Conspicuously, the DPD’s definition of consent is not phrased in terms of whether consent must be 
“opt-in” (i.e. based on an affirmative act, such as clicking a box on an online form or providing a 
signature) or “opt-out” (e.g. not unclicking a pre-ticked box). Instead, debates have tended to focus on 
whether the absence of the term “explicit” suggests that opt-in consent is not required as a general 
matter.80 
 
In this respect, it has thus been suggested that the DPD’s definition is somewhat cryptic as well as 
restrictive, as the use of ambiguous terms like “specific”, “freely given” and “informed” allow for a 
broad spectrum of interpretation.81 Moreover, the DPD says nothing in respect of the methods data 
controllers may, or should, use as a means of obtaining consent. However, Article 2(h)’s requirement 
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 Explicit consent, a term which is not defined by the Directive, is required for the processing of data relating to 
the racial or ethnic origins, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, or the 
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that the data subject must “signify” their consent implies that complete inaction on behalf of the 
individual will not be sufficient to amount to valid consent.82  
 
The Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA) is currently the UK’s most significant legislative instrument in 
the data protection field and transposes the terms of the DPD into the UK’s domestic legal order. In 
accordance with what is said in the DPD, Schedule 2 of the DPA states that for the processing of 
personal data to be rendered lawful said processing must fall under one of the abovementioned 
legitimising grounds for processing, one of which is the consent of the individual. The DPA, however, 
contains no definition of consent, nor any guidance as to what is required to validly obtain it.  
 
In lieu of any concrete guidance in respect of consent’s interpretation being offered by the texts of the 
DPD and DPA themselves, the Information Commissioner’s Office,83 the UK’s independent 
regulatory body responsible for matters regarding privacy and data protection, has offered its own 
views on how consent should be understood. Notably, in its 2017 guide to data protection, the ICO 
agrees that the DPD’s inclusion of the word “signify” means that an individual’s consent must be 
actively communicated if it is to be considered valid, and that valid consent cannot be inferred from a 
failure to communicate. It is also expressly stated that any consent obtained by way of duress or 
misrepresentations will not adequately satisfy the conditions for the processing of personal data.84 The 
ICO also advises that an individual’s consent should be “absolutely clear”, and that it must at the very 
least cover the types of information to be processed, the purposes of any processing, and any special 
aspects of that processing that may affect the individuals whose personal data are involved.85 
 
Additional guidance as to the interpretation of consent can also be found in UK case law. In British 
Gas Trading v Data Protection Registrar,86 for instance, the British Data Protection Tribunal drew a 
distinction between new and existing customers of British Gas to determine when data protection 
law’s consent requirement would be satisfied. The Tribunal held that new customers of the company 
would be taken to have consented to their personal data being used for advertising purposes if they 
had the option to opt-out in the initial contract for service. In respect of already existing customers, 
however, it was held that a failure to return an opt-out form would not amount to true consent.87 
Beyond providing enough information to the individual in order for them to express consent, in order 
for an individual’s consent to be considered validly obtained the individual from whom the consent is 
sought must also be afforded a reasonable opportunity to express their consent, or the lack thereof.88 
 
Outside of the field of data protection law, other UK cases have also provided some general guidance 
on the meaning of consent in other contexts, many of which correlate strongly with the 
abovementioned ICO guidance and data protection cases. As a general matter, it would appear, for 
instance, that in both criminal and civil law contexts for an individual’s consent to be considered valid 
the consenting individual must have been made fully aware of what it is to which they are giving their 
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consent,89 and that valid consent cannot be obtained by way of duress nor expressed through entirely 
passive acquiescence.90 
 
The Article 29 Working Party has also on occasion given its advice on consent’s true meaning and 
how it should be understood in the data protection context. Notably, in its 2011 opinion on the 
definition of consent, the Working Party examined the concept very closely, specifying several key 
criteria that must be met for an individual’s consent to be considered valid.91 Notably, the Working 
Party concluded that only statements or actions that unambiguously indicated an individual’s 
agreement would constitute valid consent. Whilst this did not specify whether consents must be “opt 
in” or “opt out”, the clear implication was that the complete inaction of the individual would never be 
enough to amount to genuine consent.92 Furthermore, it was made clear that for consent to be 
considered freely given, and therefore valid, notice must be provided to the individual in clear and 
understandable language prior to any processing of personal data occurring, and that in the event of an 
individual withdrawing their consent the data controller must delete any personal data pertaining to 
that individual unless another legal basis that justified the storing of those data could be identified.93 
3.2.2 The General Data Protection Regulation 
 
As explained above, the General Data Protection Regulation94 has been drafted as a means of bringing 
the European data protection framework into alignment with contemporary data-handling practices 
and will be directly applicable and binding in full on all EU Member States from May 2018. Despite 
“Brexit”, and the UK setting a course to leave the EU, the UK Government has confirmed it still 
intends to implement the substantive terms of the GDPR.95  
 
The upshot of this is that to from May 2018 at the latest the DPA will no longer apply and, to all 
intents and purposes, will effectively be replaced in its entirety by the GDPR and complementary 
national legislation. Significantly, for the purposes of this article, the GDPR retains the consent of the 
individual as a legitimising ground for the processing of personal data,96 but contains a revised, and 
apparently narrower, definition of consent, which differs from its DPD equivalent. Specifically, the 
GDPR defines consent as: 
 
 “…any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s 
wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies 
agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her.”97 
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Upon first inspection, the GDPR makes no material change to the general principle that consent is one 
way in which the processing of personal data can be legitimised and rendered lawful. However, if one 
is to analyse the GDPR’s provisions relating to consent more thoroughly, particularly its recitals, it 
quickly becomes apparent that the GDPR makes it considerably more difficult for data controllers to 
obtain valid consent than is the case currently under the DPD or DPA. 
 
In Recital 32, for instance, it is specified that consent can be expressed by: 
 
“…a written statement, including electronic means, or an oral statement. This could include 
ticking a box when visiting an internet website, choosing technical settings for information 
society services, or another statement or conduct which clearly indicates the data subject’s 
acceptance of the proposed processing of his or her personal data.” 
 
It is also made clear in Recital 32 that: 
 
“Silence, pre-ticked boxes, inactivity, a failure to opt-out, or passive acquiescence do not 
constitute valid consent.” 
 
Recital 42 then states that: 
 
“Where processing is based on the data subject’s consent, the controller should be able to 
demonstrate that the data subject has given consent to the processing operation.” 
 
That: 
 
“Consent should not be regarded as freely given if the data subject has no genuine or free 
choice or is unable to refuse or withdraw consent without detriment.” 
 
That: 
 
“…a declaration of consent preformulated by the controller should be provided in an 
intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language and it should not 
contain unfair terms.” 
 
And that: 
 
“For consent to be informed, the data subject should be aware at least of the identity of the 
controller and the purposes of the processing for which the personal data are intended.” 
 
Recital 43 further specifies that: 
 
“In order to ensure that consent is freely given, consent should not provide a valid legal 
ground for the processing of personal data in a specific case where there is a clear imbalance 
between the data subject and the controller, in particular where the controller is a public 
authority…” 
 
From this overview of the GDPR’s provisions relating to consent, we can identify several notable 
ways in which obtaining valid consent is a more demanding task under the GDPR than is presently the 
20 
case under the DPD or DPA. This is something that has been acknowledged in the data protection 
literature, with various observers noting the GDPR’s stricter consent requirements.98 
 
The first obvious difference between the GDPR and the DPD is the fact that whilst under the DPD the 
data subject is required to “signify” their consent for it to be considered valid, under the GDPR the 
data subject will be required to express their consent by way of a “statement or clear affirmative 
action”. The obvious implication of this being that future consents must be obtained on an “opt-in”, 
rather than “opt-out”, basis if they are to be considered valid. 
 
Secondly, whilst the DPD sheds very little light on the meaning of the phrase “freely given”, with 
most guidance in relation to this term coming in the form of Article 29 Working Party opinions, the 
GDPR makes it considerably more challenging for data controllers to demonstrate that any consents 
obtained have been given freely. Particularly, as noted above, under the GDPR data controllers are 
obliged to ensure that all data subjects have a “genuine choice” in respect of any prospective consent 
transactions to which they are subject, and to observe a general presumption that consents cannot be 
freely given, and therefore cannot form the legal basis for the processing of personal data, where there 
is a clear imbalance between the data subject and the data controller. 
 
From the text of the GDPR itself, it is not immediately obvious what is meant by the term 
“imbalance”. Some guidance as to its meaning can be found, however, in the recently published ICO 
draft guidance on the GDPR’s consent requirements.99 Particularly, the ICO advises that an imbalance 
of power will exist when an individual is reliant on another party for the provision of services, or fears 
adverse consequences linked to the withdrawal of those services, and feels they have no choice but to 
agree to whatever terms the services provider offers. Specifically, the ICO notes that relationships 
between employers and employees, as well as relationships between individuals and public 
authorities, are those in which a clear imbalance of power is likely to exist between the involved 
parties.100  
 
In other words, it would appear that an imbalance of power will be present where there is an 
observable inequality of bargaining power between two or more parties, due to the level of influence 
one has over the other.101 It would therefore appear that the notion of “imbalance” in the immediate 
context is comparable to its usage in other areas of EU law, notably those which deal with consumer 
protection.102 In the fields of consumer and competition law, however, various observers have noted 
an apparent reluctance of the CJEU to articulate minimum standards of fairness and consumer 
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protection, which, in turn, has impeded the development of a comprehensive understanding of the 
concept.103 
 
In any event, as noted above, and as is alluded to by both the ICO guidance the GDPR itself, 
imbalances of power are likely to be particularly prominent in situations in which the data controller 
is a public authority.104 Significantly in this regard, however, though the GDPR makes numerous 
references to public authorities throughout its text, “public authority”, like “imbalance”, is a term that 
is not fully defined at any point.105 Some guidance as to its meaning can, however, perhaps be inferred 
from CJEU case law outside the data protection field. When addressing matters concerning the 
doctrine of direct effect in Foster v British Gas,106 for instance, the CJEU considered the notion of 
“emanation of the state”, and remarked that it was a term that should be taken to refer to: 
 
“…a body, whatever its legal form, which has been made responsible, pursuant to a measure 
adopted by the State, for providing a public service under the control of the State and has for 
that purpose special powers beyond those which result from the normal rules applicable in 
relations between individuals...”107 
 
Though the terms “emanation of the state” and “public authority” are not necessarily synonymous 
with one another, it seems highly probable that the former is broad enough to encompass the latter. 
 
More recently, however, in Fish Legal108 the CJEU specifically considered the meaning of “public 
authority” in the context of the Public Access to Environmental Information Directive,109 which 
requires public authorities to provide environmental information upon request.110 Here, it was 
remarked that in order to determine whether a body constitutes a public authority it should be 
examined whether it possesses “special powers beyond those which result from the normal rules 
applicable in relations between persons governed by private law”.111 The possession of such “special 
powers”, therefore, would likely indicate that a body was a public authority. The Court further 
observed that if a body is incapable of acting in a genuinely autonomous fashion, and that it cannot 
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demonstrate that its provision of services is free from decisive influence of any governmental or 
public administrative organisations, this would also likely indicate that it was a public authority.112 
 
Further guidance as to the meaning of the term may also be found in the text of, and case law relating 
to, the Human Rights Act 1998,113 the statute responsible for incorporating the terms of the European 
Convention on Human Rights114 into the UK’s domestic legal order. Significantly, Section 6 of the 
HRA states that it will be unlawful for a public authority to act in a way that is incompatible with any 
of the rights contained in the ECHR,115 and specifies that the term “public authority” will encompass 
any court or tribunal,116 as well as any person certain of whose functions are functions of a public 
nature, not including the Houses of Parliament or any person involved in parliamentary 
proceedings.117 Other than this general guidance, however, it has been left to UK Courts to identify 
and determine the identity of public authorities. The leading case in this regard is Aston Cantlow 
Parochial Church Council  v Wallbank.118 Here the House of Lords suggested that the central 
characteristic of a public authority would be an ability to act in a way that was “governmental in the 
broad sense of that expression”.119 It appears that the test for whether a body constitutes a public 
authority in this context, therefore, is not whether the body in question is owned or operated by the 
state, but whether it performs a function that can be considered governmental in nature. In subsequent 
cases it has since been suggested that functions are likely to be considered governmental if they 
involve the exercise of coercive or other particularly intrusive powers, which would ordinarily, but 
not necessarily exclusively, be based on statute.120 Conversely, it would appear that functions 
exercised on the basis of private contractual relationships are unlikely to be deemed governmental. 
Notably the UK Data Protection Bill includes a limited list of public authorities in its section 6 and 
refers specifically to section 3 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000121 for this purpose.  
 
 
Thirdly, whilst the DPD fails to provide any details or guidance on the methods that can be used to 
obtain valid consent, the same cannot be said in respect of the GDPR. As noted above, the GDPR 
specifically recognises the validity of several methods that may be utilised by data controllers as a 
means of obtaining consent, ranging from verbal statements and written statements, to the ticking of 
boxes and the adjustment of technical settings. In so doing, the GDPR endorses the sentiment that 
different methods for obtaining consent may be more suitable than others in certain contexts, and 
compels data controllers to pick those that are most suitably aligned to their data processing practices. 
It is further made expressly clear that complete inaction or passive acquiescence on behalf of the data 
subject will never amount to genuine consent. 
 
One final significant difference between the DPD and the GDPR relates to data controllers being able 
to demonstrate that they have obtained valid consent from data subjects. Whilst the DPD does not 
explicitly contain any requirement that data controllers must maintain evidence of any consents 
obtained from data subjects, the GDPR makes it clear that data controllers are formally required to be 
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able to demonstrate that the consents they have obtained have been obtained validly. In situations in 
which a data subject and a data controller disagree as to whether consent has been validly given or 
obtained, therefore, the burden of proof will be on the data controller to demonstrate that this has 
occurred, which in turn will require an audit trail. 
 
In addition to the apparently tightened rules regarding consent that can be found in the text of the 
GDPR itself, the abovementioned ICO draft guidance on the GDPR’s consent requirements offers 
further clarification as to consent’s interpretation.122 Notably, and perhaps unsurprisingly, the ICO’s 
draft guidance stresses that the words “unambiguous” and “clear affirmative action” in the GDPR’s 
definition of consent must be interpreted as meaning that all consents must be obtained on an opt-in 
basis. The guidance, for instance, particularly warns against using pre-ticked boxes or similar methods 
of acquiring consent by default.123 Additionally, the ICO guidance specifies that any organisation or 
third parties with whom data controllers intend to share personal data on the basis of an individual’s 
consent must be explicitly named prior to the giving of consent in order for that consent to be deemed 
valid; the naming of specific sectors or categories of third parties will not be enough to sufficiently 
demonstrate compliance with the GDPR.124 In a similar vein, it is also specified that where possible, 
individuals should be given granular options to consent, rather than being presented with very broad 
consent notices.125  
 
Perhaps most interestingly, however, the ICO guidance specifically addresses the point that consent, 
as noted above, is only one of a number of legitimising grounds by which the processing of personal 
data can be rendered lawful, and that data controllers should only seek to rely on it in appropriate 
circumstances. In this respect, the guidance draws precise attention to the fact that, due to imbalances 
in power between parties, consent will, in the majority of circumstances, not be an appropriate legal 
basis for personal data processing operations undertaken by public authorities, and advises that public 
authorities should actively avoid relying on consent and seek to identify alternative legitimising 
grounds for the processing of personal data.126  
3.3 Processing that is necessary for the conclusion or performance of a contract to which the 
data subject is a party 
 
Both the DPD and GDPR specify that, other than relying on individual consent, the processing of 
personal data may lawfully occur when such processing is necessary either for entering or performing 
a contract with the individual to whom those data relate.127 As has been noted elsewhere,128 
“necessary” is an adjective that appears frequently in other legislative instruments, notably the ECHR. 
Significantly in this regard, the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights - which has 
been approved by the CJEU - has historically adopted an interpretation requiring that the practice in 
question be close to essential for the specified purpose.129  
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The work of the Article 29 Working Party appears to suggest that a similar standard would be 
required in the data protection context if process personal data were to be processed on this basis.130 In 
other words, in order to legitimately process personal data on this basis, it would appear that data 
controllers must be able to show that it would be essentially impossible to enter a contract, or perform 
a contractual duty in relation to a particular individual, without processing any of said individual’s 
personal data. The requirement that the processing be “essential” should also probably be read 
together with the principle of data minimisation.  
 
This legitimising ground is likely to be particularly relevant in situations involving a contractual 
agreement between an individual and a private party, such as a bank or insurance company. For 
instance, in order for a bank or insurer to be able to evaluate an individual’s application for a loan or 
an insurance policy, the consideration of information such as the individual’s name, date of birth and 
address will be integral to making such a determination.131 Another salient example provided by the 
Article 29 Working Party is that the processing of personal data may in some situations be necessary 
for the performance of a contract of employment.132 As others have suggested, however, this ground 
for the processing of personal data is perhaps of limited applicability in this context. Whilst it may, for 
example, be useful for an employer to record details of employees’ next of kin in the event of accident 
or illness at work, this would not ordinarily be considered essential for the normal purposes of 
employment, and thus the identification of an alternative ground for processing would likely be 
required to render such a practice lawful.133  
3.4 Processing that is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest 
or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller 
 
The European data protection framework also specifies that the processing of personal data is 
permissible when such processing is necessary for the performance of tasks carried out by a public 
authority or private organisation acting in the public interest. Particularly, Article 7(e) DPD and 
Article 6(1)(e) GDPR both specify that processing will be lawful when it is: 
 
“…necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise 
of official authority vested in the controller…” 
 
Whilst neither the DPD nor the GDPR explicitly define the term “public interest”, both legislative 
instruments allude to the fact that matters concerning public health, social protection, taxation and 
customs administrations, humanitarian issues would fall within its scope.134 This is an understanding 
of the term that is also alluded to by the Art.29 Working Party.135 The UK ICO has more rigorously 
examined the notion of “public interest” in the data protection context, and in its guidance on the 
public interest test in the context of the UK Freedom of Information Act 2000 states that: 
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“The public interest can cover a wide range of values and principles relating to the public 
good, or what is in the best interests of society. Thus, for example, there is a public interest in 
transparency and accountability, to promote public understanding and to safeguard 
democratic processes. There is a public interest in good decision-making by public bodies, in 
upholding standards of integrity, in ensuring justice and fair treatment for all, in securing the 
best use of public resources and in ensuring fair commercial competition in a mixed 
economy…”136 
 
Section 7 of the UK Data Protection Bill, which as noted above has been drafted as a means of 
transposing the main terms of the GDPR into the UK’s domestic legal order after “Brexit”, is more 
concise and states that the processing of personal data will be deemed to be in the public interest if it 
is: 
“necessary for the administration of justice, the exercise of a function of either House of 
Parliament, the exercise of a function conferred on a person by an enactment, or the exercise 
of a function of the Crown, a Minister of the Crown or a government department.” 
 
More broadly, away from the data protection field, notably in the context of issues relating to the free 
movement of goods, services, persons or capital, the CJEU has considered the term, amongst other 
things, to encompass matters relating to: the protection of public health, the protection of consumers, 
the protection of the environment, ensuring the integrity of the financial sector, the prevention of 
crime, the maintenance of financial and competitive balance, and the need to ensure the proper 
functioning of sporting competitions.137  
 
Irrespective of the definition of public interest itself, however, it is important to note that any 
processing of personal data undertaken on this basis may be subject to objections from the individuals 
whose personal data are involved.138 Once again, it is also important to pay heed to the DPD and 
GDPR’s inclusion of the term “necessary”. A clear apparent implication of this being that the 
processing of personal data in pursuit of performing a task that is in the public interest will not be 
permissible unless the achievement of said task cannot be achieved without the processing of personal 
data, and said processing cannot be legitimised by other means, such as the consent of the affected 
individuals. 
3.5 Processing that is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests of the data 
controller or other third party 
 
The final legitimising ground for the processing of personal data listed by both the DPD and the 
GDPR is possibly the most extensive, and perhaps also the most controversial. It sanctions the 
processing of personal data where it is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued 
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by the data controller or by a third party or parties to whom the data are disclosed, except where such 
interests are overridden by the interests for fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject.139 
 
Whilst the DPD says little in respect of the meaning of “legitimate interests”, the recitals of the GDPR 
offer some insight as to its interpretation. Recital 47, for instance, specifies that a legitimate interest 
could exist where there is a “relevant and appropriate” relationship between the data subject and data 
controller, such as situations in which the data subject is a client of, or in the service of, the controller.  
 
As specific examples the Recital also states that the processing of personal data for the purpose of 
preventing fraud “constitutes a legitimate interest” and the processing of personal data for the purpose 
of direct marketing may be regarded as being carried out for a legitimate interest. However, in the 
Recital it is also made clear and emphasised that the legitimate interests of data controllers could be 
overridden by the fundamental rights of individual data subjects in situations where said individuals 
do not reasonably expect their personal data to be processed.140 In other words, any processing of 
personal data that is undertaken on the basis of the legitimate interests of the data controller will not 
be considered valid if said legitimate interests are outweighed by a need to protect the fundamental 
rights of individual data subjects whose personal data are involved. In this respect it is important to 
note, therefore, that determining the existence of a legitimate interest will require a careful assessment 
in respect of any potential balancing that may be required in relation to any competing fundamental 
rights of affected individuals.  
 
As another interesting caveat, Article 6(1) of the GDPR also makes it clear that this ground for 
personal data processing will not apply to processing carried out by public authorities in the 
performance of their tasks. In this respect, however, the abovementioned possible ambiguities 
inherent in the term “public authority” must be kept in mind. Similarly, the abovement ioned 
restrictions associated with the adjective “necessary” must also be remembered.  
 
The legitimate interest concept has also been considered by both the Article 29 Working Party and the 
CJEU. In a 2014 opinion on the legitimate interests of data controllers, for instance, the Article 29 
Working Party clarified both the words “legitimate” and “interest” in the data protection context. The 
Working Party first suggested that “interest” is not a term that is synonymous with “purpose”. 
According to the Working Party, in data protection discourse the “purpose” of a data processing 
activity is the reason or aim why any data are processed. Conversely, an “interest” is the benefit that 
may be derived from that processing.141  
 
Secondly, the Working Party suggested that the notion of a “legitimate interest” is broad, but 
highlighted some of the most common situations in which legitimate interests within the data 
protection field may arise. These included: the exercise of the right to freedom of expression; 
conventional direct marketing; unsolicited commercial messages; the enforcement of legal claims and 
debt collections; the prevention of fraud; employee monitoring; and the processing of personal data 
for historical, scientific or statistical purposes.142  
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In summation of the above points, the Working Party advised that in order to be relevant under data 
protection law, a legitimate interest must be: lawful (i.e. in accordance with applicable EU and 
national law); sufficiently clearly articulated to allow a balancing exercise to be carried out in relation 
to the interests and fundamental rights of affected individuals; and must represent a real and present 
interest, as opposed to an interest that is purely speculative.143 
 
In the same opinion the Working Party also advised that any balancing assessment a data controller 
undertakes in relation to their own legitimate interests and the fundamental rights of individuals 
should not in any way be thought of as straightforward, nor a case of merely attempting to weigh and 
balance two easily calculable and comparable values. In this vein, the Working Party explicitly 
warned against data controllers treating the legitimate interests condition as an “open door” to 
legitimise their data processing activities.144  
Instead, the working party suggests that making such a determination requires an extensive 
consideration of a number of factors, such as the nature and source of the data controller’s legitimate 
interest, the potential impact the proposed processing would have on the individual or individuals 
whose data were involved, and the existence or presence of any additional safeguards which could 
limit undue impact on these individuals, such as privacy enhancing technologies, increased 
transparency, rights to opt-out, and the right of data portability.145 This advice on the potential 
complexity of making such assessments correlates strongly with what was said on the matter by the 
UK ICO in its 2014 discussion paper on big data and data protection.146 
 
More recently, in Rīgas satiksme,147 the CJEU also examined the legitimate interests ground for 
personal data processing. Particularly, the court considered the meaning of the term “necessary” and 
the question of whether the legitimate interests ground for data processing imposes obligations on 
data controllers to disclose the personal data of an individual to a third party for the purposes of 
allowing said third party to initiate legal proceedings against that individual.  
 
The conclusion arrived at by the CJEU was that the disclosure of an individual’s personal data in such 
a scenario on the basis of the legitimate interests ground for processing would only be permissible in 
cases where the fundamental rights of that individual do not take precedence. The CJEU also 
concluded that the legitimate interests ground for processing does not impose any obligations on data 
controllers to disclose personal data to third parties in situations similar to that mentioned above, but 
merely permits them to make such disclosures in accordance with the national laws of the Member 
State in which they are based.  
 
Of particular interest were the remarks of AG Bobek, who suggested that the concept of a legitimate 
interest was “elastic enough” to encompass considerations other than a need to protect property, 
health, and family life, specifically identifying the issuing of a legal claim as a particular example. 148 
The AG also seemingly re-emphasised the earlier guidance of the Article 29 Working Party by 
suggesting that as a part of any attempts to balance the legitimate interests of a data controller with the 
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fundamental rights of an individual “due consideration should in particular be given to the nature and 
sensitivity” of the data involved.149 In his concluding remarks the AG also suggested that whilst the 
original and primary purpose of data protection law is the regulation of large-scale datasets involving 
personal data, “a much lighter touch” would be called for in situations involving datasets of a lesser 
size or individual pieces of information.150 In so doing, the AG’s comments appear to endorse a 
position of pro-active reliance on the legitimate interests ground for personal data processing in 
appropriate circumstances. As has been remarked elsewhere, for instance, this position might be said 
to sit somewhat uneasily with the abovementioned Article 29 Working Party opinion, which urges 
data controllers not to think of the legitimate interests condition as an open door to legitimise their 
data processing operations.151 
3.6 Gov.UK Verify and its dual legal basis 
 
The study of the content of the DPIA concluded in 2016 shows that Gov.UK is intended to be 
grounded upon two and not one legal basis,152 although in public communications targeting service 
users in particular consent has probably been presented as being the main legal basis. While the legal 
basis corresponding to the “processing that is necessary for the task carried out in the public interest 
or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller” does not seem to raise any concern, 
consent as the second (or probably first) legal basis creates some difficulties.  
 
One key question is thus whether consent is a valid legal basis for the processing undertaken by 
identity providers. First, one could note that there is potentially free choice for data subjects as both 
identity providers and service providers should offer alternative means to access their services. 
Besides, the explanation found below the description of the first identity assurance principle stresses 
that “[f]ailing to do so would undermine the consensual nature of the service.”153 
 
However, one could argue that despite the fact that these identity providers are private companies 
there should be a presumption of a clear imbalance between the data subject and the controller in the 
same way as there seems to be a presumption of a clear imbalance between data subjects and public 
authorities. It is evident, for instance, that there is a very intimate relationship between identity 
providers and the GDS. This raises the question as to whether identity providers could be assimilated 
into public authorities even though they could not be described as such as per the definition contained 
within the Freedom of Information Act.  
 
There are several reasons as to why it may be possible to answer this question in the positive. First of 
all, identity providers are certified by the GDS.154 Second, identity providers are actually paid by the 
GDS.155 Third, the relationship between identity providers and the GDS is regulated through the 
means of a complex framework agreement, which is made up of a range of stipulations relating to 
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reports, records and monitoring by the GDS.156 Interestingly, in most other Member States, the 
verification of identity is undertaken by public authorities. Out of the ten countries currently operating 
eID schemes, four use only public eID means, whereas in four others public and private means co-
exist. Although in many the construction of the infrastructure and the means (e.g. the cards) happens 
by private entities (through tenders), authentication is usually operated by the government. Only two 
countries (the UK and Denmark) have opted for exclusively private means (due in part to the lack of 
governmental ID cards). 
 
Country Classification of eID means Comments 
Austria Public Multi-means (mix of public and private) eIDs, such 
as governmental eID cards and (private) mobile eIDs. 
Issuing of eIDs is always a governmental task. 
Certificates come from a private certification 
authority (under supervision of the government). The 
market fulfils subsequent roles (e.g. mobile eID 
means) as long as they meet the government’s 
standards. 
Belgium Public Identity and identification under governmental 
control (through an eID card). Private parties were 
involved through tenders in the realisation of the 
infrastructure, but the means remain under 
government’s control. 
Denmark Private Denmark does not have a national ID card. 
Therefore, eID is provided from the private sector 
through five-year long tenders. 
Estonia Public and private Estonia operates a governmental eID card but several 
banking cards with eID functions co-exist. The 
public eID card allows for more transactions than the 
banking cards due to the higher assurance level it 
offers. 
France Public (unimplemented) France has designed a public eID card which was 
rejected by the French Constitutional Council. No 
alternative means are currently in the works. 
Germany Public In Germany, identification, including eID, falls 
exclusively within the domain of the public sector. 
The means used is an official eID card (that doubles 
as an offline ID document). Private parties are 
involved in the production of the cards, but their use 
and operation is controlled by the government. 
Luxembourg Public and private Traditionally eID provision was administered by way 
of a public-private partnership, LuxTrust, with the 
government owning two thirds of the shares. 
Recently, however, Luxembourg has begun the 
rollout of a public eID card. 
Portugal Public The Portuguese eID scheme operates with a public 
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eID card (that serves also offline ID purposes). 
Spain Public (and public and 
private) 
At present there are two eID schemes operating in 
Spain: a nationwide public eID card and a certificate-
based card that uses a mix of public and private 
means. The alternative certificate-based scheme is 
not recognised in all regions of Spain. 
Sweden Public and private The Swedish eID scheme was previously exclusively 
based on banking cards. Concerns in respect of the 
lack of inclusivity of this arrangement, however, 
have led to the introduction of a public eID card, 
offered by a public carrier. The two means of eID 
now co-exist under the same scheme. 
UK Private In the UK authentication is operated by private sector 
actors, selected by the government through a tender. 
The actors not only carry out the authentication, but 
also verify the identity of the users themselves. 
 
Table 3: eID schemes country profiles
157
 
 
 
If we are to assume that there is such a thing as a European concept of public authorities (which 
should be independent from any competing national definitions)158 there is an argument that 
companies certified by the GDS should also be considered public authorities themselves. As noted 
above, for instance, the jurisprudence of both the CJEU and UK courts suggests that any bodies or 
institutions, irrespective of their legal form, that are responsible for providing a public service on 
behalf of the state, are afforded special powers or competencies by way of their relationship with the 
state, or are unable to act autonomously and in a way that is free from decisive influence of the state, 
must be considered public authorities. Companies certified by the GDS could arguably be described 
as possessing some, if not all, of these characteristics. 
 
Consent as a legal basis becomes even more problematic when used directly by (government) service 
providers. As touched upon above, to the question whether “suppliers/partners have the right to use 
the personal information collected or shared under the service for their own purposes”159 the answer 
appears to be that “Government Services may use information for their own purposes, but will have to 
disclose purposes and details of information required to the service user on a per-transaction basis, 
and seek appropriate consent.”160  
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Assuming consent cannot operate as the legal basis for the processing of personal data between 
service users and identity providers we are thus left with the performance of a task carried out in the 
public interest, unless the legal basis corresponding to the conclusion or performance of a contract 
could also potentially be relied upon, assuming there is a contract between the certified companies 
and the service users.  
 
From the analysis of the doctrine of legal bases undertaken above, it appears that the role given to 
consent under the GDPR has expressly been curtailed in comparison to its role within the DPD. As a 
result, it is arguable whether consent could be used at all to legitimise the processing of personal data 
by identity providers. Suspicions towards consent as a legal basis rise significantly when one allocates 
data protection roles to the four actors identified in the second section: GDS, (government) service 
providers, identity providers and service users. This is mainly due to the way in which the relationship 
between the GDS and the identity providers could be characterised as a situation of joint 
controllership in relation to the personal data processing activities undertaken by the identity 
providers themselves.   
4. Choosing the appropriate legal basis in a situation of joint controllership  
Having considered the grounds substantive legitimising grounds for the processing of personal data in 
the previous section, as well as their potentially applicability to GOV.UK Verify, this section of the 
article explains the doctrine of joint controllership, distinguishes it from the more orthodox processor-
controller relationship that is typically inherent in many contemporary data-handling practices, and 
then analyses to what extent eIDAS frames the relationships of the different parties to an eID scheme. 
The ecosystem of GOV.Uk Verify is then assessed in light of these considerations. 
4.1 The doctrine of joint controllership  
 
The DPD does expressly acknowledge the possibility of having situations of joint controllership.  It 
uses the expression “alone or jointly with others” and provides that a data controller is:  
 
“…the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which alone 
or jointly with others determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal 
data; where the purposes and means of processing are determined by national or 
Community laws or regulations, the controller or the specific criteria for his nomination 
may be designated by national or Community law.”  
 
The Article 29 Working Party in its opinion on the concepts of “controller” and “processor” 161 
attempts to provide some guidance on the notion of processing that is undertaken “alone or jointly 
with others” and refers back to the opinion of the Commission on the European Parliament to explain 
that a situation of joint controllership can exist even in situations in which the data controllers do not 
“equally” determine the means and purposes of a “single processing operation.”162 
 
Furthermore, the Working Party also confirms that the approach that should be used for categorising 
joint controllership should be the same as that used for characterising situation of sole controllership: 
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“a substantive and functional approach,... focusing on whether the purposes and means are 
determined by more than one party.”163 
 
However, whilst at the beginning of its analysis the Working Party appears to consider that each data 
controller shall contribute to both the determination of the means and the purposes of the processes, it 
modifies its analysis, and specifies a few lines later that a party should be categorised as a controller if 
it is able to determine either the purpose or the essential elements of the means of an act of personal 
processing, as opposed to both:  
 
“In this perspective, joint control will arise when different parties determine with regard 
to specific processing operations either the purpose or those essential elements of the 
means which characterize a controller.”164 
 
In other words, a data processor should only ever be considered a joint controller if it determines the 
purpose or the “essential elements” of the means that characterize a controller.165 A considerable 
variety of situations of joint controllership could thus be imagined.166 Such a situation is perhaps 
particularly likely to arise when “different actors would decide to set up a shared infrastructure to 
pursue their own individual purposes.”167 
 
The Working Party then goes on to distinguish between two complementary approaches that are both 
relevant in order to determine whether a joint controllership situation exists in a particular scenario: a 
micro-level approach and a macro-level approach. In the words of the Working Party: 
 
“In some cases, various actors process the same personal data in a sequence. In these 
cases, it is likely that at micro-level the different processing operations of the chain 
appear as disconnected, as each of them may have a different purpose. However, it is 
necessary to double check whether at macro-level these processing operations should not 
be considered as a “set of operations” pursuing a joint purpose or using jointly defined 
means.”168  
 
In a chain of processing activities, the pursuance of a “joint purpose” thus appears crucial for the 
characterisation of a situation of joint controllership. Consequently, joint controllers are jointly 
responsible for any personal data processing operations relevant to that purpose. 
 
As an interesting point of reference, a typology of the various different types of relationships between 
data controllers, co-controllers, and processors developed in 2005 by Olsen and Mahler, encompasses 
the majority of the types of collaboration envisaged by the Working Party in its guidance.169 
Particularly, it identifies that joint controllers will primarily come in two forms: partly joint 
                                              
163
 Ibid  
164
 Ibid, pg. 19.  
165
 As has been noted elsewhere, however, the Working Party’s distinction between “essential” and “non-
essential” means appears to conflict with the definition of “Controller” found in Article 2(d) of the Data 
Protection Directive. See: Van Ecke, P. and Truyens, M. (2010) “Privacy and Social Networks”, Computer Law 
& Security Review 26(5), pg.539. 
166
 n.160, pg. 19.  
167
 Ibid  
168
 Ibid, pg. 20.  
169
 Olsen, T. and Mahler, T. (2005) “Privacy - Identity Management Data Protection Issues in Relation to 
Networked Organisations Utilizing Identity Management Systems”, Legal IST project, pp.40-47. 
33 
controllers and fully scope joint controllers. A partly joint controller would be present where the 
purpose and means of a certain processing operation is determined jointly by more than one 
controller, while others are performed separately under the sole control of another controller, whereas 
a controller could be considered a full-scope joint controller if it and another controller jointly 
determine all the purposes and means of a particularly data processing operation.170 This clarification 
aside, however, some observers have suggested that the notion of joint controllership remains a vague 
and confusing concept, particularly in certain contexts.171 
 
What is also interesting is the way in which the Working Party directly mentions the example of e-
government portals as a specific example of a platform that would fall within the definition of joint 
controllership. This is because e-government portals tend to involve various actors jointly determining 
“the purposes and/or the means of a processing operation.”172 For the sake of clarity, it is worth 
repeating Working Party’s justification of its position in full:  
 
“E-Government portals act as intermediaries between the citizens and the public 
administration units: the portal transfers the requests of the citizens and deposits the 
documents of the public administration unit until these are recalled by the citizen. Each 
public administration unit remains controller of the data processed for its own purposes. 
Nevertheless, the portal itself may be also considered controller. Indeed, it processes (i.e. 
collects and transfers to the competent unit) the requests of the citizens as well as the 
public documents (i.e. stores them and regulates any access to them, such as the 
download by the citizens) for further purposes (facilitation of e-Government services) 
than those for which the data are initially processed by each public administration unit. 
These controllers, among other obligations, will have to ensure that the system to 
transfer personal data from the user to the public administration's system is secure, since 
at a macro-level this transfer is an essential part of the set of processing operations 
carried out through the portal. 
 
Although this explanation was written in 2010, when GOV.UK Verify was not even in its infancy, 
and most the existing eID schemes were centralised and run by public authorities,173 it may be 
premature to conclude that the position will necessarily be different when it comes to determining the 
categorisation of federated eID schemes. 
 
What is also important in the context of joint controllership the fact that if a situation arises where one 
data controller is not in a position to meet all of its obligations as a data controller, and that another of 
its joint controllers is better place to perform certain data controller obligations, this will not prevent 
the involved parties from being categorised as joint controllers.174 Furthermore, the Working Party 
insists that the lack of transparency in respect of the allocation of roles between different data 
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controllers can lead to an infringement of the principle of fair processing.175 This is a position that has 
been implicitly endorsed by the UK ICO.176 
 
The GDPR goes further than the DPD: not only is the GDPR more explicit in its recognition of 
situations of joint controllership, but also, as is explained in the next section of this article, it expressly 
derives the consequences of such a characterisation in terms of liability. For now, however, it is 
sufficient to note that the GDPR imposes an obligation on joint data controllers to determine their 
roles and responsibilities in a transparent manner so to ensure GDPR compliance. The terms of the 
GDPR appear particularly concerned with ensuring compliance with data subject rights, such as the 
right to information, “unless, and in so far as, the respective responsibilities of the controllers are 
determined by Union or Member State law to which the controllers are subject.”177  
 
With all that has been said above in mind, the choice between a characterisation of a situation joint 
controllership and a processor-controller relationship is not necessarily a straightforward exercise. 
After having recalled the two cumulative criteria for qualifying an actor involved in the processing of 
personal data a processor that originates from DPD Article 2(e),178 i.e. being an entity separate from 
the controller and processing personal data on behalf of the controller, the Article 29 Working Party 
offers a bundle of indicators to identity a processor-controller relationship: 
 
● The range of the margin of manoeuvre left to the processor as a result of the instructions of 
the controller 
● The modalities of the monitoring undertaken by the controller to supervise the activity of the 
processor 
● The information provided by the controller to data subjects in relation to the allocation of 
roles between the different parties and thereby the expectations  of data subjects as a 
consequence of this information 
● The degree of expertise of each party179 
 
However, the Working Party also insists upon placing a great deal of focus the complexity of 
processing activities, which can lead, perhaps prematurely, to prefer the characterisation of a situation 
of a joint data controllership rather than a processor-controller relationship, when combined with an 
assessment of the privacy risks: 
 
“…the complexity of processing operations may lead to put more focus on the margin of 
manoeuvre of those entrusted with the processing of personal data, e.g. when the 
processing entails a specific privacy risk. Introducing new means of processing may lead 
to favouring the qualification as data controller rather than data processor. These cases 
may also lead to a clarification - and appointment of the controller - explicitly provided 
for by law.”180  
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Taking the example of processing activities undertaken for historical, scientific and statistical 
purposes, including anonymisation practices, Article 29 WP specifies that when data coming from 
different sources are combined together, “there is a particular threat to data protection, justifying the 
intermediary organization's own responsibility.”181 
  
Because with the GDPR, the demarcation between the roles of processor and controller become less 
clear as processor’s obligations have been multiplied and the status of processor made closer to that of 
controller, one could make the argument that the balance should be tipped in favour of a 
characterisation of a situation of joint controllership. This is a proposition that has been alluded to in 
the data protection literature, albeit with some observers suggesting that the blurring of boundaries 
between data controllers and data processors caused by technological evolution could lead to the 
emergence of a “confused” approach to data protection.182 
 
That joint controllers should be considered to be joint and severally liable is a not a novelty unique to 
the GDPR. Despite the silence of the DPD, the Article 29 Working Party in 2010 interpreted the DPD 
as implying that the default rule under the DPD was that of joint and several liability.183 However, the 
GDPR offers a more radical solution than the one anticipated by the Working Party. This is because 
even when joint controllers determine in a transparent manner their roles and responsibilities for the 
purposes of ensuring compliance with the GDPR, joint data controllers remain jointly and severally 
liable. GDPR Article 26(3) provides that: “Irrespective of the terms of the arrangement referred to in 
paragraph 1, the data subject may exercise his or her rights under this Regulation in respect of and 
against each of the controllers.” Reading Article 26(3) together with Article 82(3) it appears that one 
joint controller will only be able to escape liability for the actions of another if it can demonstrate that 
“it is not in any way responsible for the event giving rise to the damage”.184  
 
 
4.2 eIDAS partition of roles 
 
As alluded to above, eIDAS identifies the main actors of an eID scheme and their roles in the process 
of identification and authentication. However, significantly, eIDAS adopts a technologically neutral 
approach and does not attempt to dictate the way eID schemes should be designed.185 Concurrently, if 
one is to examine the various national eID schemes that have been deployed to date in EU Member 
States, there is an observable variety in respect of their technological architectures. This was 
something that was recognised during the preliminary work leading up to the enactment of eIDAS.  
 
In 2013 a feasibility study conducted as part of the EU IAS project noted that eID solutions “were 
heterogeneous from a technology perspective, using smartcards […], Mobile eID’s […], allowing soft 
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certificates […], or even username/password […].”186 It continued by stating that “[m]ost solutions 
were established well before there was a common middleware standard”.187 This forced the STORK 
pilot, which formed the basis for eIDAS, “to create a model that could accommodate the various 
existing models.”188 Along the same lines, the impact assessment accompanying the eIDAS proposal 
acknowledged a number of potential problems linked to issues concerning interoperability and cross-
border interaction that could be posed by Member States using “different technological solutions for 
personal identification.”189  
 
It is certainly true to say that eIDAS aims at supporting the creation of an interoperability framework 
to make cross-border transactions possible, and its implementation acts to some extent constrain its 
design.190 However, per definition this is true only in the context of cross-border transactions and not 
in the context of internal transactions. This is because the interoperability framework has been 
conceived as a means to identify a minimum common denominator that could be accepted by all 
Member States without affecting the design or operation of their national eID schemes in relation to 
internal transactions. As a result, eIDAS should not be seen as a tool for comprehensively determining 
the roles and responsibilities of controllers involved in eID schemes.  
 
What is true, however, is that by definition eIDAS specifies the purposes of the processing: 
identification and authentication, which should (although this is not explained in these terms in 
eIDAS), comprise two stages. The first being the creation of the electronic identification means from 
personal identification data, and the second being the subsequent use of the electronic identification 
means for authentication purposes. eIDAS gives a seemingly confusing account of this process in the 
sense that it seems to distinguish between identification and authentication, despite their definitions 
being very similar:  
 
● Electronic identification: “the process of using person identification data in electronic form 
uniquely representing either a natural or legal person, or a natural person representing a 
legal person.”191 
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● Authentication: “electronic process that enables the electronic identification of a natural or 
legal person, or the origin and integrity of data in electronic form to be confirmed.”192 
 
As a result, it is not entirely clear whether electronic identification is a term that exclusively covers 
the creation of the electronic identification means, or if it also encompasses subsequent acts of 
authentication. That said, despite this imprecise language, the creation of the electronic identification 
means and confirming the identity of an individual through an electronic identification means are 
closely related activities, and will inevitably constitute acts of either electronic identification or 
authentication, if not both. 
  
As mentioned above, eIDAS distinguishes between three actors: notifying Member States, parties 
issuing electronic identification means, and parties operating authentication procedures. eIDAS 
expressly recognises the fact that the electronic identification means can be issued by private parties. 
Article 7 therefore distinguishes three hypotheses: when the electronic identification means are issued 
by the notifying Member States, when they are issued under a mandate from the notifying Member 
State, or when they are issued independently of the notifying Member State but are recognised by that 
Member State. 
 
The notifying Member State appears to be the one with the most obligations or duties. It shall ensure: 
 
● the person identification data uniquely representing the person in question is attributed, in 
accordance with the technical specifications, standards and procedures for the relevant 
assurance level set out in the implementing act referred to in Article 8(3), to the natural or 
legal person referred to in point 1 of Article 3 at the time the electronic identification means 
under that scheme is issued;193 
● the person identification data uniquely representing the person in question is attributed, in 
accordance with the technical specifications, standards and procedures for the relevant 
assurance level set out in the implementing act referred to in Article 8(3), to the natural or 
legal person referred to in point 1 of Article 3 at the time the electronic identification means 
under that scheme is issued;194 
● the availability of authentication online, so that any relying party established in the territory 
of another Member State is able to confirm the person identification data received in 
electronic form.195 
● the cross-border authentication [is] provided free of charge when it is carried out in relation 
to a service online provided by a public sector body.196 
 
Parties operating authentication procedures do not seem, contrary to the text of eIDAS Article 11, to 
be subject to any specific obligation or duty.  
 
Parties issuing electronic identification means shall ensure:  
 
● the electronic identification means is attributed to the person referred to in point (d) of this 
Article in accordance with the technical specifications, standards and procedures for the 
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relevant assurance level set out in the implementing act referred to in Article 8(3);197 
 
This description appears to confirm, therefore, that the obligations and duties of eIDAS actors are 
broadly formulated and not necessarily data-protection related, but do cover personal data processing 
activities. At the same time, eIDAS is narrower in scope than the GDPR in that it only targets three 
types of actors.  
 
Furthermore, Article 11 of eIDAS sets the liability rules applicable in cases in which the obligations 
and duties enumerated above are violated. Importantly, Article 11’s liability rules are negligence 
based and do not specify any presumption of liability:  
 
The party issuing the electronic identification means shall be liable for damage caused 
intentionally or negligently to any natural or legal person due to a failure to comply with 
the obligation referred to in point (e) of Article 7 in a cross-border transaction.198  
 
There is therefore a prima facie conflict between Article 11 of eIDAS and Articles 26 and 82 of the 
GDPR Articles 26 and 82. Ensuring a high level of data protection in the field of electronic 
identification would however require applying Articles 26 and 82 of the GDPR to matters involving 
the processing of personal data. This would mean that the conflict that exists between Article 11 of 
eIDAS and Articles 26 and 82 of the GDPR could not be alleviated by way of an argument that 
eIDAS is a sector-specific regulation in comparison to the GDPR. Accordingly, Article 11 of eIDAS 
derogates from Articles 26 and 82 GDPR.  Instead, Articles 26 and 82 of the GDPR should still be 
applied to eID scheme actors. One way to accommodate this predicament would be to argue that 
eIDAS and the GDPR are complementary pieces of legislation, which would mean that a granular 
analysis and comparison of each of their respective provisions is necessary in instances where 
conflicts between appear to arise, in order to determine the most restrictive rules.199 This route is 
preferable to arguing that the eIDAS is a sector-specific piece of legislation as its liability provisions 
are not the only provisions that could potentially be in conflict with those of the GDPR. In this respect 
it is also worth noting that eIDAS contains more restrictive rules in relation to breach notification 
obligations than the GDPR.200 
 
Interestingly, the partition in the final version of eIDAS differs slightly from its draft text.  Notably, in 
earlier drafts201  of eIDAS rules relating to requirements imposed on Member States in relation to 
notifying the European Commission of their national eID schemes scheme lacked the phrase “at the 
time the electronic identification means under that scheme is issued”.202 Therefore, according to this 
wording, the Member State would have been constantly liable for the unambiguous attribution of 
personal identification data throughout the use of an eID (as opposed to just at the time of first 
issuance, which is the case under the final version). Under the same draft,203 Member States were 
liable for the availability of user authentication “at any time and free of charge” and did not 
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discriminate between public-sector and private-sector relying parties. On the contrary, the final 
version of eIDAS allows Member States to “define terms of access to that authentication” and 
guarantees free of charge access to public-sector bodies only.204 Lastly, the final version of eIDAS is 
more precise in respect of its provisions regarding the liability of participating parties,205 with earlier 
drafts containing only liability provisions regarding Member States “without prejudice to the liability 
of parties to a transaction in which electronic identification means falling under the notified scheme 
are used.”206 
4.3 Gov.UK Verify and its segregation of roles and responsibilities  
It is true that the DPIA attempts to distinguish between two types of purposes in order to distinguish 
the processing activities of identity providers-certified companies from the processing activities of 
GDS. It is explained that “GDS will process personal data for the purpose of matching Service Users 
to Government Service records.”207 At the same time, “[p]urposes for Certified Companies 
processing personal data are defined within the procurement documentation, and Certified 
Companies are obliged to clearly state purposes in their privacy notices.”208 This seems to explain or 
justify why identity providers and GDS are both data controllers but for their respective processing 
activities a distinct legal basis needs to be identified. 
 
However, a careful analysis of both the framework agreement and the reality of the practices show 
that the different processing activities are better described as a set of processing activities aimed at a 
common purpose: authentication.  
 
While contractual arrangements are a useful tool to characterise the situation at hand, this does not 
mean that the qualifications retained by the parties should necessarily be retained. These 
qualifications should be confronted with the factual arrangement of the relationship.209 The framework 
agreement, as aforementioned, specifies the purposes for the processing in its schedule 2(a) on 
services description: to “provide the following online identity assurance services to users seeking to 
access any HMG Service, with the objective of allowing them to prove that they are who they claim to 
be to defined levels of assurance.”210  
 
In addition, from the perspective of service users, i.e. data subjects, it is artificial to distinguish 
between the processing undertaken by identity providers, GDS and (government) service providers. 
The three types of processing activities aim to ensure the realisation of one process: authentication for 
a communicating with a (government) service provider. 
 
The question is then whether for this set of processing activities identity providers should be 
categorised as processors or data controllers. It is true that under the framework agreement identity 
providers are imposed security obligations,211 obligations to ensure data subjects can exercise their 
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rights,212 reporting obligations in favour of GDS,213 an obligation to request authorisation for the 
transfer of personal data to third countries,214 an obligation to appoint any material sub-contractor,215 
and obligations relating to the training of identity providers’ personnel.216 It is also worth noting that a 
monitoring and supervision mechanism is put in place.217 In any event, GDS is meant to review each 
certified company’s privacy notice.218 
 
As the GOV.UK Verify DPIA confirms, the set of processing activities inherent in the use of the 
service are extremely complex and necessarily require the data from a variety of sources, some of 
which should be considered highly sensitive, such as authentication credentials and transactional data. 
However, when it comes to authentication credentials, only service users and identity providers retain 
them. Besides, identity providers also have access to citizen verification data, i.e. “information about 
or from passports and driving licences (...) commonly used to obtain other forms of ID,”219 which is 
rightly described as being “more sensitive than other attribute data.”220 There is thus an argument that 
identity providers should be qualified as joint data controllers with GDS and (government) service 
providers for the set of processing activities leading to authentication.  
 
Assuming GOV.UK Verify embodies a situation of joint controllership between three parties: the 
identity providers, GDS and the (government) service providers, it becomes problematic to exclude 
the activities of identify providers or certified companies from the scope of the compliance checks.221 
 
More importantly, assuming GOV.UK Verify embodies a situation of joint controllership between the 
identity providers, GDS and the government service providers, the identification of a distinct legal 
basis for the processing performed by identity providers arguably becomes a moot point.  
 
Crucially, assuming GOV.UK Verify embodies a situation of joint controllership, this would require 
revising the allocation of responsibilities between the different parties, despite the fact that eIDAS 
expressly contains a provision on liability in its electronic identification chapter, i.e. Article 11. 
Indeed, as mentioned previously the GDPR opts for a principle of joint and several liability in Article 
82(4-5) to be read together with Article 26(3).  
5. Conclusion  
To conclude, this article suggests that due to the way in which the GDPR strengthens both the rights 
of data subjects (e.g. through granting a right to compensation based upon a presumption of liability), 
and revisits the status of data processors as well as narrows down the remit of the legal basis based on 
consent, it will have a considerable impact in the field of electronic identification as in many other 
sectors. One significant conclusion that can be drawn from this conclusion is, therefore, that data 
protection impact assessments performed at the time of the DPD should be re-conducted in order to 
fully take into account the novelties brought about by the GDPR. Critically, the DPIA for GOV.UK 
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Verify, the UK eID scheme, should be conducted afresh as matter of urgency, as its development to 
date has seemingly been premised upon a DPIA that is now worryingly outdated. As a means of 
supporting this position, this article has highlighted and analysed several apparent flaws in GOV.UK 
Verify’s DPIA, the most significant and notable of which being the identification of an erroneous 
selection of legal bases and a set of liability stipulations which would appear to be incompatible with 
the substantive provisions of the GDPR.  
 
More specifically, the article has argued that identifying the appropriate legal basis for the processing 
of personal data requires a prior understanding and characterisation of the relationship between the 
different actors participating in said processing in order to determine whether one legal basis, or 
perhaps several legal bases, are required, and whether some should be excluded from the very 
beginning given the involvement of stronger parties, such as public authorities. Furthermore, the 
characterisation of a situation of joint controllership requires taking a holistic approach to the set of 
processing activities intended to achieve a specified and/or specific purpose. This is the only way to 
ensure the full effects of Article 82 of the GDPR. 
 
Finally, the article has argued that, rather than being considered as antagonistic to one another, eIDAS 
and the GDPR should be seen as complementary pieces of legislation. Both, for instance, are 
simultaneously sector-specific: eIDAS only applies to electronic identification and trust services, 
while the GDPR only applies to the processing of personal data. This should mean that when eIDAS 
and GDPR provisions are potentially in conflict, a detailed analysis of each of their respective 
apparently conflicting provisions should be undertaken in order to select those that are the most 
restrictive. This is because electronic identification and trust services are about to become, if they are 
not already, essential gateways to eGovernment services, and most likely to the Digital Single Market 
as well.  
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